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I. INTRODUCTION
It is not permitted to... us to indulge our feelings of ab-
stract right on these subjects; the law... recognises [that]
right.., although its existence is abhorrent to all our
ideas of natural right and justice.'
[How can I respond to you when you are saying what you
seek is fairness and justice? To be brutally frank, I don't
know that fairness and justice have much to do with it....
I have to punish you with great severity because that's
what the law requires me to do.2
The first quote is an excerpt from a judge's charge to the jury
in an 1833 Pennsylvania case which sent an African-American
slave back to his owner under the hated Fugitive Slave Act.3 The
second is from a federal district court judge in 1996. The judge,
Robert Matsch (D. Co.),4 was responding to a plea for mercy from a
first-time offender he was about to sentence to thirty years in
prison for a crack cocaine conspiracy. While separated by one
hundred and fifty years, these two judges shared the same pre-
dicament; each felt bound by oath and office to take away a man's
freedom under a Congressional act that each personally viewed as
morally bankrupt.
Neither of these statements should be viewed as an isolated
rant from a cantankerous jurist. In fact, there is a long tradition of
American judges using the bench as a bully pulpit to declare laws,
enacted by Congress and upheld by the Supreme Court, morally
wrong. Today, as noted by Judge Matsch, the issue is not slavery
but sentencing. In the last two decades, Congress has dramati-
cally increased the penalties for drug and gun offenses, while si-
1. Johnson v. Tompkins, 13 F. Cas. 840, 843 (C.C.E.D.Pa. 1833) (No.
7,416) (per Baldwin, Cir. J.).
2. Sentencing Transcript at 41, United States v. Williams (D. Colo. Feb.
16, 1996) (No. 94 CR 254 M) (on file with author) [hereinafter Williams Sen-
tencing Transcript].
3. Johnson, 13 F. Cas. at 843.
4. See Williams Sentencing Transcript, supra note 2. Judge Matsch is
nationally known for presiding over the Oklahoma bombing cases. Peter An-
nin & Tom Morganthau, Putting the Plot on Trial (Judge Richard Matsch to
Try the Oklahoma City Bombing Case), NEWSWEEK, Jan. 29, 1996, at 30,
available at 1996 WL 9471141.
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multaneously restricting judicial sentencing discretion, thereby
depriving judges of the ability to ameliorate the results of these
higher penalties in sympathetic cases. Since 1986, this new sen-
tencing regime has required federal judges to condemn thousands
of men and women to actual or the equivalent of life sentences
without parole.5 And sadly, a disproportionate number of these
men and women are the African-American descendants of those
who were forcibly kept in slavery.6
Robert Cover argued that although the abolitionists were
deeply disappointed in the failure of the judiciary to protect es-
caped slaves, the natural rights rhetoric of Northern judges was
ultimately an important component in turning the tide of North-
ern public opinion against slavery.7 Similarly, for the first time
5. A twenty or thirty year sentence for a defendant in the fifties or
higher is essentially a life sentence. For example, 70-year old Robert Van
Doren, who was suffering from prostate cancer, was sentenced to twenty
years in prison after he was found with a total of sixty-five grams of cocaine
in 1996. United States v. Van Doren, 182 F.3d 1077, 1079-80 (9th Cir. 1999).
When sentencing Van Doren, District Court Judge Marilyn Huff expressed
her displeasure with this "incredibly sad case" caused by the mandatory
minimums. "[T]he Court takes no pleasure in giving a lengthy sentence. If it
were up to the Court, if I had discretion, I would think that 10 years would be
sufficient punishment." Sentencing Transcript at 55, United States v. Van
Doren (S.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 1997) (No. 96-1082-H-Crim.) (on file with author).
6. "Nationwide more than 40% of the prison population consists of Afri-
can-American inmates. About 10% of African-American men in their mid-to-
late 20's are behind bars. In some cities more than 50% of young African-
American men are under the supervision of the criminal justice system." An-
thony M. Kennedy, Speech at the American Bar Association Annual Meeting
3 (Aug. 9, 2003) (on file with author) [hereinafter Kennedy ABA Speech]. Ac-
cording to the Bureau of Justice Statistics website, the number of black
adults under correctional supervision rose from 1,117,200 in 1986 to
2,149,900 in 1997. Bureau of Justice Statistics, Demographic Trends in Cor-
rectional Population by Race, at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/glance/tables
cpracetab.htm. Obviously, there is a critical difference between slaves who
were imprisoned for no offense other than the color of their skin and drug de-
fendants duly convicted for trafficking in drugs. Nevertheless, the dispropor-
tionate impact of the drug laws and the devastating impact on inner-city
African-American communities cannot be overlooked. Some have even argued
that the drug laws constitute a new form of slavery and even genocide. See,
e.g., Richard Dorvak, Cracking the Code: "De-Coding" Colorblind Slurs Dur-
ing the Congressional Crack Cocaine Debates, 5 MICH. J. RACE & LAW 611
(2000); Knoll J. Lowney, Smoked Not Snorted: Is Racism Inherent in our
Crack Cocaine Laws?, 45 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 121 (1994).
7. ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED; ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS 119-22 (1975).
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since these sentencing laws came into effect in the 1980s, there is
reason to hope that judicial voices might be heard and heeded in
this debate. In the past year, three Supreme Court Justices have
stepped forward to talk about the harshness of the federal crimi-
nal penalties or the rigidity and unfairness of mandatory mini-
mums.
The speech that garnered the most attention was that of As-
sociate Justice Anthony Kennedy.8 He chose the keynote address
at the ABA Annual Meeting in August 2003 to make his state-
ment. His ultimate conclusions were simple and powerful. He
said, "our resources are misspent, our punishments too severe, our
sentences too long."9 He singled out mandatory minimums stat-
utes as "unwise and unjust,"'10 and he argued that while sentenc-
ing guidelines in principle can be a component of a fair criminal
system, the existing Federal Sentencing Guidelines need to be re-
vised downward." Justice Kennedy also criticized the continuing
transfer of sentencing discretion from judges to federal prosecu-
tors as misguided. 12
Soon thereafter, Justice Stephen Breyer, a primary author of
the original Sentencing Guidelines, delivered a speech criticizing
mandatory minimums, stating "'there is no room for flexibility on
the downside" and that "'is not a helpful thing to do .... It's not
going to advance the cause of law enforcement in my opinion and
8. President Reagan nominated Justice Kennedy to the Supreme Court
in 1988. He was viewed at the time as conservative. On the bench, he has
largely voted with the conservative majority but there have been some sur-
prises, such as Lawrence v. Texas, which declared Texas' criminalization of
consensual homosexual sodomy unconstitutional. 593 U.S. 558 (2003).
9. Kennedy ABA Speech, supra note 6, at 4.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 5. The trial judge, he asserted, "is the one actor in the system
most experienced with exercising discretion in a transparent, open, and rea-
soned way. Most of the sentencing discretion should be with the judge, not
the prosecutor." Justice Kennedy concluded with a request that the ABA
study the matter and then asked Congress to repeal mandatory minimums
and the President to reinvigorate the pardon process so that some already
serving these sentences might be released. Id. Since then, the ABA Justice
Kennedy Commission has begun to hold hearings throughout the country in-
vestigating different aspects of the American criminal justice system. Brenda
Sapino Jeffreys, ABA Commission Holds Hearings on Criminal Justice in
Texas, TExAS LAWYER, Feb. 16, 2004, available at WL 2/16/2004 Tex. Law. 10.
The author testified before this Commission on November 12, 2003.
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it's going to set back the cause of fairness in sentencing."' 13 Chief
Justice William Rehnquist's contribution was a series of remarks
targeted at the controversial 2003 Feeney Amendment. "In un-
usually pointed terms," he condemned the provisions which place
judges under special scrutiny when they lower sentences, stating
that the act "'could appear to be an unwarranted and ill-
considered effort to intimidate individual judges in the perform-
ance of their duties." 4
Nevertheless, as important as these voices could be to the de-
bate over sentencing reform, this essay focuses on the less promi-
nent voices of district court judges like Judge Matsch who have
labored for years in relative obscurity to implement Congress's di-
rectives. Like the pre-Civil War judges, federal judges have not
just been doing an unpleasant duty and going quietly back to their
cloistered chambers. Some have been so outraged that they have
gone public with their complaints in the press. A significant few
resigned (or took senior status and declined to hear criminal
cases).' 5 Many others have used the moment of sentencing, just as
the antebellum judges did, to proclaim their fealty to the rule of
law, yet also to denounce the injustice of the laws passed by Con-
gress.
But these statements have not received the press that the re-
cent remarks by the Supreme Court Justices did. A variety of rea-
sons explain this difference, such as the local nature of cases and
13. Martin Finucane, Breyer Assails Sentencing Rules, PITT. POST
GAZETTE, Sept. 22, 2003, at A18, available at 2003 WL 64500168. Breyer also
noted that Chief Justice William Rehnquist and "others on our court" shared
his views. Id.
14. Linda Greenhouse, Chief Justice Attacks a Law as Infringing on
Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2004, at A14. Rehnquist has also criticized man-
datory minimums in the past but has not gone as far as Kennedy who called
for an overall lowering of penalties. See Michael Brennan, A Case for Discre-
tion; Are Mandatory Minimums Destroying Our Sense of Justice and Com-
passion, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 13, 1995, at 18, available at 1995 WL 14647063
(reporting Rehnquist's claim that mandatory minimums were "a good exam-
ple of the law of unintended consequences").
15. Richard T. Boylan, Do the Sentencing Guidelines Influence the Re-
tirement Decisions of Federal Judges?, 33 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 231 (2004) (pro-
viding statistical support for the proposition that judges took senior status at
a higher rate in the period when the Guidelines became effective and were
determined to be constitutional); see also Criticizing Sentencing Rules, U.S.
Judge Resigns, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1990, at 22 (reporting the resignation of
Federal District Judge J. Lawrence Irving).
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the lower public profile of district court judges. In addition, most
district court judges are hesitant to engage in political debate or
talk to the media. Thus, most of their comments have been made
in nearly empty courtrooms during sentencing proceedings. While
duly recorded by court reporters, their statements have usually
been heard only by the attorneys and a few family members of the
defendants. Sometimes eloquent orations, other times steely civics
lectures, and occasionally angry tirades against Congress or the
prosecution, federal judges have expressed their unhappiness with
the dual straightjacket of mandatory minimums and the guide-
lines. As time has passed with little legislative relief, and more of-
ten, with new penalties and more restrictions on their discretion,
many have come to feel that they have been shouting into the
wind; their words dissipating quickly in the face of political slo-
ganeering about drugs and crime.
Nevertheless, even if it will take the broad brush strokes of
the giants on the Supreme Court to get the public's attention on
this issue, listening to the voices of those closest to the actual de-
fendants and cases themselves makes sense. For when the nation
finally reaches a period where a more rational and equitable sen-
tencing regime is possible, the knowledge and expertise of the dis-
trict court judges, with their daily intimacy with these laws, will
provide the best information about what changes are necessary. I
feel fortunate that the Open Society shared my belief that these
statements are of value. With their funding and a visiting posi-
tion, I have been in Washington, D.C. for a year and a half work-
ing to gather and document these kinds of cases. I have
corresponded with hundreds of federal inmates, read their case
files and interviewed their sentencing judges. Out of this research,
I have compiled about fifty judges and case profiles that represent
the issues and concerns of the judges. In this essay, I share a few
of these profiles that reflect two of my most important findings.
First, I will discuss the types of cases that most distress the
judges. While judicial outrage over long sentences for sympathetic,
low-level offenders is reasonably well known, I also found that a
significant number of judges are concerned with the unduly puni-
tive nature at the high end of the sentencing table. Thus, some of
my profiles concern cases involving relatively serious, but nonvio-
lent, drug dealers who received extremely long terms, including
life sentences, that were largely the result of drug quantity. The
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second finding I discuss in this essay concerns disparity. Although
Congress has severely limited judicial sentencing discretion, many
judges contend that discretion, and therefore disparity, has not
disappeared from the system. Rather, it has merely been trans-
ferred to the police and prosecutors, where judges argue that it is
both less transparent and almost always unreviewable. Thus,
some of my profiles show how prosecutorial and police discretion
contribute to dramatic instances of sentencing disparity. Thus,
this essay posits that the claimed congressional cure has both
failed to remedy the disease of disparity and created its own op-
pressive harms.
II. DRACONIAN SENTENCES BASED SOLELY ON DRUG AMOUNTS
A. The Impact of Mandatory Minimums, the Federal Drug
Conspiracy Statute, and the United States Sentencing Guidelines
In brief summary, the current sentencing regime is the prod-
uct of both increased statutory penalties in 1986 and 1988 and the
implementation of the United States Sentencing Guidelines in
1987. The first important piece of legislation to take effect was the
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986.16 This statute imposed weight based
mandatory minimum penalties of five, ten, and twenty years (and
life without parole for certain recidivists) for trafficking in rela-
tively small amounts of most illegal narcotics such as crack co-
caine, LSD, heroin and marijuana.17 For example, possession with
intent to distribute five grams of crack cocaine, with a street value
of only about $500 in 1986,18 carries a five-year mandatory pen-
16. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986) (codified as amended 21
U.S.C. §§ 841-848 (2000)). The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 created the
U.S. Sentencing Commission and mandated the creation of the Guidelines.
However, it took the original Commission three years to release the first ver-
sion.
17. Many have argued that "the careful, deliberate procedures of Con-
gress were set aside in order to expedite passage" of the mandatory mini-
mums in the immediate aftermath of the death of college basketball star Len
Bias. Eric E. Sterling, The Sentencing Boomerang: Drug Prohibition Politics
and Reform, 40 VILL. L. REV. 383, 408 (1996).
18. Jane Gross, A New Purified Form of Cocaine Causes Alarm as Abuse
Increases, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1985, at Al; see also Don J. DeBenedictis,
How Long Is Too Long?, 79 A.B.A. J. 74 at 76 (1993) (stating the street value
for crack cocaine was $100 per gram).
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alty. 19 Fifty grams results in a ten-year mandatory.20 If the defen-
dant had any prior drug felony, including relatively minor state
charges, 21 the mandatories double to ten and twenty years.22 Two
prior drug felonies and fifty grams of crack requires a mandatory
life sentence without parole. 23 These crack penalties are also
largely responsible for the increase in racial inequities in the fed-
eral prison population. Because of the hysteria over the crack epi-
demic in 1986, Congress made the penalties for crack 100 times
more severe than for powder. 24 Ironically, even though all the co-
caine in the country is imported as powder, the penalty structure
is less harsh for the actual importers than for the inner city black
youth at the bottom of the distribution chain.25
Congress expanded the reach of the drug mandatory mini-
mums in 1988 by making them applicable to charges of conspiracy
to possess or distribute narcotics. 26 Before this amendment, drug
distribution conspiracies were covered by the general federal con-
spiracy statute, which carries a maximum five-year sentence.27
Adding conspiracy to the mix, however, did more than just in-
crease the number of cases eligible for the mandatory penalties.
19. 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (2000).
20. Id.
21. For example, simple possession of any kind of cocaine is a felony in
Rhode Island. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 21-28-4.01 (2002).
22. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A).
23. Id.
24. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A), (B).
25. "The most ironic effect of the 100:1 ratio involves those cases in which
a retail crack dealer receives a longer sentence than the wholesale powder
distributor who supplied him the powder cocaine from which the crack was
produced." William Spade, Jr., Beyond the 100:1 Ratio: Towards a Rational
Cocaine Sentencing Policy, 38 ARIz. L. REv. 1233, 1273 (1996). Historically,
inner city minorities have been the primary distributors and users of the
crack form of cocaine. The relative cheapness of a single dose of crack has
been one explanation for this phenomenon. Crack, however, is nothing more
than powder cocaine mixed with the right proportions of water and baking
soda and popped into a microwave. Moreover, early reports that crack was
more addictive or dangerous to pregnant women have turned out to be over-
stated. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, REPORT TO CONGRESS:
COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY, iv-v (2003) at http://www.ussc.
gov/rscongress/02crack/2002crackrpt.pdf.
26. 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 963 (2000).
27. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2000); see also United States v. Davis, 793 F.2d 246
(1986) (charging defendant with conspiracy to distribute cocaine under the
general federal conspiracy statute).
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Now a marginal participant is subject to a mandatory minimum,
even if he never had possession or even constructive possession of
drugs. Even taking a phone message or giving a ride to a friend is
enough to draw a person into the conspiracy, so long as a jury be-
lieves the defendant agreed to assist the primary actor.28
The 1986 Act also increased sentences by requiring drug
quantity (and hence the applicable mandatory minimum) to be de-
termined by weighing the entire "mixture or substance," not just
the amount of actual narcotic.29 This provision was intended to
punish dealers who increased their sales by mixing narcotics with
cutting agents, 30 but it had devastating consequences for defen-
dants involved with drugs such as LSD. The weight of an actual
dose of LSD is negligible, too small to easily be put into a pill.
Therefore, LSD is generally sold on sheets of paper, with individ-
ual doses dried onto stickers or decals on the paper. The user licks
the paper to ingest the drug.31 As upheld in Neal v. United
States,3 2 the mixture or substance requirement compels a sentenc-
ing court to weigh the paper as the relevant "mixture or sub-
stance" to assess the statutory penalty.33 Since a ten-year
mandatory requires only ten grams of LSD, dealers who, for ex-
ample, use heavy paper, generally receive at least the ten-year
mandatory.3 4 The facts that most LSD defendants are part of very
local distribution rings, that many engage in subsistence dealing
as part of their Grateful Dead lifestyle, or that there is virtually
no violence connected to LSD trafficking or use are all irrelevant
to the application of the mandatory minimum.
The Sentencing Guidelines, while intended to bring rational-
ity and fairness to federal sentencing, actually exacerbated the
draconian penalties under the 1986 Act. As recounted elsewhere,
the first Commission had not finished its work when the 1986 Act
28. See, e.g., United States v. Esparsen, 930 F.2d 1461 (10th Cir. 1991).
29. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(v).
30. There are several justifications for this provision. Some cutting
agents are themselves poisonous. Imprecision in cutting agents for drugs like
heroin also can lead to more deaths and hospitalizations as users are unsure
of the purity of the substance. More sales also equaled more profits.
31. See generally United States Drug Enforcement Agency, Lysergic Acid
Diethylamide, available at www.dea.gov/concern/lsdfactsheet.html.
32. 515 U.S. 284 (1996).
33. Id. at 296.
34. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(v).
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took effect. Confronted with this new penalty structure, the Com-
mission decided to use the mandatory minimums as the floor for
the base offense levels for most federal drug crimes. 35 As a result,
the Guideline range for most defendants is higher than statutory
minimums.36 In fact, until amended by the Sentencing Commis-
sion in 1994, the Guidelines sometimes required life sentences
without parole solely on drug quantities even when the statute did
not.
37
"Draconian" is the adjective most frequently employed to de-
scribe these sentences. On an aggregate level, the following statis-
tics are illustrative. The average federal drug sentence before
1984 was 65.7 months.38 By 1991, this average ballooned to 95.7
months.39 While there has been a slight decrease in drug sen-
tences over the past ten years, probably due to the "quiet rebel-
lion" of prosecutors and judges,40 the increase in the federal prison
35. See Jesseca R.F. Grassley, Federal Sentencing Policy Following the
Cocaine 1995 Report: Issues of Fairness of Just Punishment, 21 HAMLINE L.
REV. 347, 392 (1998). Note that for live marijuana plants and LSD, the Com-
mission ultimately decided to use a more rational calculus divorced from the
mandatory minimum weight calculations. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL app. C, amend. 516 (2002) (amending the manner in which mari-juana plants are counted) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.]; U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 488(2002) (amending the manner in which LSD is weighed for sentencing pur-
poses).
36. Although there can be reductions for minimal or minor role and such,
drug amounts above the statutory minimum carry increasing higher base of-
fense levels under the Guidelines. Thus, for example staying with crack co-
caine, 20-35 grams carries a base offense level for a defendant with no prior
convictions of 78-97 months, already 18 months higher than applicable five
year mandatory. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.l(c) (2002); U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A, sentencing
table (2002). Add in even a few minor convictions and the same quantity
might require sentencing ranges of 87-108 months or 97-121 months. Id.
37. Frank 0. Bowman, III & Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion? Explaining
Nearly a Decade of Declining Federal Drug Sentences, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1043,
1076 (2001).
38. Frank 0. Bowman, III & Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion II: An Em-
pirical Analysis of Declining Federal Drug Sentences Including Data From
the District Level, 87 IowA L. REV. 477, 479 (2002).
39. Id.
40. Bowman & Heise coined this term to characterize their hypothesis
that most of the players in the federal criminal justice system, including
many prosecutors and judges, recognize that many sentences are much
higher than necessary to accomplish any of the goals of sentencing. Thus, the
players have collaborated to find ways within the system to ameliorate the
results for some defendants. See Bowman & Heise, supra note 38; Bowman &
Heise, supra note 37.
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population has continued unabated. And, this increase has been
fueled largely by the addition of even more nonviolent drug of-
fenders. 41
B. Case Studies: From the Girlfriend Cases to "Real" Drug Dealers
While the media has reported some of this aggregate data,
sentencing issues usually take a back seat to reports on crimes
and arrests, or to more general coverage of the "War on Drugs."
When print and television media cover this issue, they tend to
cover only the most sympathetic defendants, with a disproportion-
ate number of stories about women inmates.42 These women tend
to fit a profile: the wives and girlfriends of drug dealers who rarely
profit from the crime. Because they were peripheral players, they
usually could not "rat out" other dealers to save themselves. Thus,
in many instances, the girlfriends received greater sentences than
their clearly more culpable partners who were able to cooperate in
exchange for lesser sentences. Focusing on the inmates them-
selves, now model prisoners - remorseful, harmless, and some-
times young and attractive, these stories have been the perfect
fodder for news shows like 20/20 and 60 Minutes.43
41. In 1980, the federal prison population was 26,600, at last count in
2004 it has grown to 172,000, and in 2010 the population is estimated to be
216,000. Vanessa St. Gerard, 216,000 Federal Inmates Projected by 2010,
CORRECTIONS TODAY, Dec. 1, 2003, at 20, available at 2003 WL 14014554. For
the first time last year, the federal prison population exceeded that of the
largest state system, California. Kevin Johnson, Federal Prison Population
Nears 165,000; Number Surpasses States' Systems, USA TODAY, Jan. 23,
2003, at A21, available at 2003 WL 5303980. The United States now has the
highest incarceration rate in the world, higher than Libya, Malaysia, and
Burma. See Philip Johnston, England Has Highest Rate of Imprisonment in
EU, DAiLY TELEGRAPH, Feb. 27, 2003, at P8, available at 2003 WL 12080817.
While the federal system accounts for only about 10% of the nation's prison
population, financial incentives to mimic the federal system have caused
many states to similarly abolish parole and otherwise adopt the punitive ap-
proach of the federal government. See David Dolinko, The Future of Punish-
ment, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 1719, 1722 (1999).
42. Impoverished drug couriers from foreign countries have also gotten
some coverage, and to a lesser degree, addicts, whose motivation was clearly
their addiction.
43. See, e.g., Chris Graves, Clinton Commutes Minneapolis Womans
Drug Sentence, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis - St. Paul), July 10, 2000, at 1B,
available at 2000 WL 6979603 (reporting Serena Nunn's release from federal
prison after serving ten years of a fourteen year sentence for conspiring to
possess and distribute cocaine).
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Nicole Richardson's story, told on a Dateline segment,44 is a
typical case. She was seventeen-years-old when she fell in love
with Jeff Thompson, a drug dealer who sold cocaine, ecstasy, and
eventually LSD.45 When one of his suppliers, who was cooperating
with the government, made a monitored call to the house, Nicole
answered and was recorded telling him where to find Thompson to
pay him for drugs.46 For this offense, she was taken out of college
and given a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence.47 Thompson,
on the other hand, received a cooperation agreement and a five-
year sentence. 48 Because he was actually engaged in trafficking,
he, and not Nicole, could provide the government with information
regarding the other drug dealers. 49 Nicole's judge was Alex. T.
Howard, Jr. of Alabama, a Reagan appointee. Judge Howard
stated that "[i]n all of my experience with guidelines, this case
presents to me the top example of a miscarriage of justice."50
While a 1994 law called the "safety-valve" now allows judges
to reduce the sentences of some of the least culpable offenders,51
my research has found that the "girlfriend" cases continue. Laki-
sha Murphy had been with her boyfriend, Cedric Robertson, since
she was fifteen. 52 Cedric was a member of the "Crips" and a drug
dealer. 53 Cedric was also a paraplegic and Lakisha was his pri-
mary caretaker, feeding and bathing him.54 Cedric dealt crack
with his gang from his wheelchair, and in fact, the government
considered him the principal of the group.55 Because Lakisha spent
most of her time caring for Cedric at his house, she clearly was
44. Dateline (NBC television broadcast, June 29, 1993) (transcript on file
with author).
45. Nancy Roman, Mandatory Drug Sentences Lead to Inequities: Rule
Forces Jails to Free Violent Felons, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1994, at A8, avail-
able at 1994 WL5493326.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Jim Dwyer, A Mad Affair of Drugs, Jails, NEWSDAY, Sept. 14, 1994, at
A2, available at 1994 WL 7398885.
49. Id.
50. Roman, supra note 45.
51. 18 U.S.C § 3553(f) (2000).
52. Sentencing Transcript at 66, United States v. Murphy (W.D. Tenn.
Aug. 22, 2002) (No. 00-10010-04) [hereinafter Murphy Sentencing Tran-
script].
53. See id. at 72, 74.
54. Id. at 38.
55. Id. at 5.
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aware of Cedric's illegal activities.5 6 She also admited that she
sometimes helped him with his drug business, and even made a
few retail sales when none of Cedric's gangmates were around.5 7
For this activity, she was sentenced in 2002 to a ten-year manda-
tory minimum sentence. 58
Judge James D. Todd, another Reagan appointee, who sits in
the Western District of Tennessee was troubled by the sentence.
He spoke directly to her at the sentencing hearing
The tragedy of this case, Ms. Murphy, is that you made a
very poor choice of boyfriends .... I have no doubt that
this was Cedric Robertson's drug operation.... [But] a
woman can stand by her man without becoming a crimi-
nal herself.... But you had the misfortune in this case of
having a boyfriend who couldn't use his arms and his legs
and couldn't care for himself, so you became his arms and
his legs. And in doing so, you did, in fact, become a crimi-
nal.... [But] part of the problem in this case, Ms. Mur-
phy, is that the sentencing guidelines passed by Congress
have tied my hands as to what discretion I have. They
have also passed mandatory minimums which also tie my
hands.5 9
In addition to the continuation of the "girlfriend" cases, my
research suggests that another category of defendants, whose sen-
tences deeply trouble some judges, has received virtually no media
attention. These cases involve very lengthy sentences, sometimes
life sentences without parole, meted out to more serious, but still
non-violent, drug dealers. In these transcripts, the judges gener-
ally go out of their way to emphasize that the defendant's conduct
56. See id. at 38-39. During this period, she usually worked a part-time
cashier's job and maintained her own residence. Id. at 38, 40 (discussing Lak-
isha Murphy's lifestyle during her relationship with Cedric Robertson).
57. Id. at 40.
58. Id. at 77. Because of two prior petty offenses, she was ineligible for
the safety valve. Id. at 74 (referring to the limitations on mandatory sen-
tences provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (2000)). Perhaps on principle, or out of
love or fear, Lakisha did not cooperate with the police. Id. at 80.
59. Id. at 72, 76. Although Cedric received 192 months, four of the other
male co-defendants who were far more culpable received less time than Laki-
sha because they cooperated. Judge Todd also noted that "it seems unfortu-
nate in this case that you're doing more time than some of these guys did...
and there's nothing I can do about it." Id. at 80.
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should be punished with a lengthy sentence. The excessiveness of
the applicable mandatory minimum (sometimes exacerbated by
the operation of the Guidelines) is nevertheless viewed as overkill
by these judges. These comments are most common in cases that
involve a mandatory life sentence based almost entirely on drug
quantity.60 Especially for judges with state court experience, life
sentences without parole are deemed appropriate only for the
most heinous murders and the most serious violent recidivists. In
addition, because there is often no likelihood of release before
death or old age, some judges are troubled that these defendants
are offered no hope and no incentive for rehabilitation. However,
because these defendants are not as obviously sympathetic, and
because the judges themselves are not as eager to ally themselves
with these men, this group of cases has received much less media
coverage. 61
Two cases from Chicago are illustrative. In 1992, Senior
Judge Milton I. Shadur62 (N.D. Ill.) sentenced Rudy Martinez to a
life term without parole for running a continuing criminal enter-
prise (CCE) that sold cocaine. 63 The Presentence Investigation Re-
port (PSR) for this case reveals that Rudy never knew his father
60. Sometimes there is also an upward adjustment in these cases for the
defendant's leadership role but the life sentence is still largely driven by drug
quantity. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 994(i)(3), (5) (2000).
61. There are exceptions. For example, Donnie Clark, who was pardoned
by President Clinton, got some media attention for his life sentence. How-
ever, that was more because of the notoriety of the federal operation which
raided a quiet Florida backwater and resulted in the arrest of many promi-
nent locals for cultivating marijuana. Paul Wilborn, A Prisoner of the War on
Drugs, COMMUNITY TIMES, Jan. 23, 1994, at 1, available at 1994 WL 5316724.
62. Judge Shadur was a private lawyer for over thirty years before being
appointed to the federal bench by President Carter in 1980. 1 ALMANAC OF
FED. JUD. 38 (7th Cir. 2004). During his years on the federal bench, Judge
Shadur has presided over many noteworthy cases, including desegregation of
Chicago's schools and prison overcrowding litigation. Id. at 39. He wrote the
first opinion validating the federal death penalty statute for drug-related kill-
ings, conducted the first trial under this statute, and developed a procedure
for picking a "death qualifying" jury. Id. In the Almanac of the Federal Judi-
ciary's anonymous survey of attorneys, many attorneys applauded Judge
Shadur's legal skills, praising him as "one of the brightest men who ever
walked onto the federal bench." Id. at 40.
63. Sentencing Transcript at 79-81, United States v. Martinez, (N.D. Ill.
April 23, 1992) (No. 91 CR 53) (on file with author) [hereinafter Martinez
Sentencing Transcript].
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and that his mother suffered from depression and alcoholism.64 By
age fourteen Rudy was using and selling drugs and he became a
member of the Latin Kings gang, following the footsteps of his
older brother.65 He was expelled from school and left home at age
sixteen to live a life on the streets.66 Rudy was arrested in 1991 for
his part in a multi-state cocaine conspiracy that operated from
1988 to 1991 in Chicago and Minnesota. 67
According the government's evidence at trial, Martinez was a
supplier for his co-defendant Cynthia Pluff.68 The government
charged that he (and others), provided Pluff with wholesale quan-
tities of cocaine on almost a weekly basis during the course of the
conspiracy. 69 Pluff then sold the cocaine in Minnesota and alleg-
edly gave Martinez some of the profits.7 0 The participants were ar-
rested after the DEA monitored a twenty-kilo delivery of cocaine
to Martinez from Florida.7 1 Both Pluff and Martinez's friend,
Chris Evans, testified against Martinez and received sentences of
four and one half, and seven years respectively, in exchange for
their testimony.7 2 A jury convicted Martinez of all but one count. 73
After trial, he did not deny selling drugs.74 Rudy also ac-
knowledged both a personal and illegal business relationship with
64. Presentence Report at 7-8, United States v. Martinez, (N.D. Ill.
March 27, 1992) (No. 91 CR 53-2) (on file with author) [hereinafter Martinez
Presentence Report].
65. Id. Rudy states he joined the Latin Kings at age twelve. Letter from
Rudy Martinez, to David Zlotnick, Associate Professor of Law, Roger Wil-
liams University School of Law (Apr. 10, 2004) (on file with author).
66. Letter from Rudy Martinez, to David Zlotnick, Associate Professor of
Law, Roger Williams University School of Law (Apr. 10, 2004) (on file with
author).
67. Martinez Presentence Report, supra note 64, at 1. Rudy believes that
the government only went back to the grand jury to request the superseding
indictment that charged him with the CCE count because he refused to
cooperate with the government. Letter from Rudy Martinez, to Families
Against Mandatory Minimums at 1 (Oct. 30, 1996) (on file with author).
68. Martinez Sentencing Transcript, supra note 63, at 13.
69. Memorandum from Ronald S. Safer, Assistant U.S. Attorney, to U.S.
Probation Officers at 1 (March 27, 1992) (regarding U.S. v. Martinez, Gov-
ernment's Official Version of the Offense) (on file with author).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 2.
72. See Martinez Sentencing Transcript, supra note 63, at 30-31.
73. Martinez Presentence Report, supra note 64, at 1.
74. Id. at 2.
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Pluff and a close friendship with another co-conspirator, Evans. v5
He denied, however, being the head of the organization and
knowledge about the full extent of the conspiracy.7 6 He argued
that his involvement included no more than 50 kilograms of co-
caine (not the 150 kilograms as reported by the cooperating wit-
nesses).77 He also told the probation officer that he felt terrible
that two other co-defendants, who he did not believe were involved
in selling drugs at all, were also convicted on the basis of the coop-
erators who implicated him.78 While he had prior arrests, this first
conviction nevertheless carried a mandatory life sentence.79
At sentencing, Mr. Martinez stated, "I have quite a lot to say
here, because we are talking about my life here."80 He spoke about
why he felt it was unfair to hold him responsible as the leader/or-
ganizer for the drug activity in Minnesota of which he was com-
pletely unaware.8' He explained that Cynthia Pluff and her family
members ran the operation in Minnesota and he was simply one of
her suppliers. While he made some money from these transac-
tions, he denied splitting the Minnesota retail profits with her,
and, in general, he contested that he made the kind of money that
the government alleged.8 2
Nevertheless, Mr. Martinez told Judge Shadur, "I am a drug
dealer. That's all I know how to do. That's all I have been doing all
my life."8 3 He made clear, however, that he did not want to use his
upbringing as "a cop out either, because it's a cheap cop out."84 But
he did talk about his childhood, his involvement in selling drugs at
a young age, and the temptation to rise above his family's poverty
by any means possible.8 5 Near the end of his comments, Mr. Mar-
75. See id. at 2, 10.
76. Id. at 2.
77. See id.; Letter from Rudy Martinez, to Families Against Mandatory
Minimums at 1 (Oct. 30, 1996) (on file with author).
78. Martinez Presentence Report, supra note 64, at 2.
79. Id. at 7. Mr. Martinez reports that after his federal conviction and
incarceration, state authorities indicted him for first degree murder but that
he was found not guilty of that charge. Letter from Rudy Martinez, to Fami-
lies Against Mandatory Minimums at 2 (Oct. 30, 1996) (on file with author).
80. Martinez Sentencing Transcript, supra note 63, at 36.
81. Id. at 36-42.
82. Id. at 41.
83. Id. at 44.
84. Id. at 45.
85. See id. at 46-50.
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tinez said that ultimately, he could not blame his situation on his
codefendants, the police, the prosecutor or even the judge.86 He
told Judge Shadur:
[A]gain I ask you if you could depart from these guide-
lines and if not it's understandable. And I know if you
have to give me mandatory life - I know most likely it's
going to come out of your mouth, and you are going to
state that, because your hands are tied and there is noth-
ing you can do about it because of this book, and I know
that. I can't be upset with you .... I think about it some-
times, your Honor, and I would hate to be in your shoes,
your Honor because it must be hard for a man to pass
judgment on someone, and may be he does want to give
him that time, and maybe he doesn't. But I pretty much
know it's out of your hands, and that must be an awful
feeling.87
In response, Judge Shadur stated:
[Flor better or worse, fairness has departed from the sys-
tem. It is no longer the operative standard for federal
judges. And as a result in a way it is sort of an insult...
to the process to talk of fairness within the context of
standards that to such a great extent do not involve con-
siderations of fairness.88
Judge Shadur then addressed Mr. Martinez directly. He told
Rudy that like many judges, he was troubled by the Guidelines
that limit their ability to do justice in a particular case.8 9 He noted
that Congress' decisions "evidence fl more trust in prosecutors
than in federal judges."90 With that said, and recognizing the
seriousness of Mr. Martinez's conduct, he sentenced him to 330
months on the drug conspiracy count (which was above the bottom
of the range on that count).91 On the CCE count, however, the
judge stated that he "simply does not have discretion" and he im-
86. Id. at 52 (Martinez stated, "I can't be upset with Mr. Safer or Ms.
Pepper or Dvorak or Maloney. I can't be upset with no one but myself.").
87. Id. at 52-53.
88. Id. at 70.
89. Id. at 78.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 80.
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posed the statutorily mandated life term.92 The judge concluded
his remarks by telling Mr. Martinez that his comments about the
sentencing laws in no way excused the "enormous seriousness of
the offenses."93 His choices "affected the lives of an enormous num-
ber of people, the consumers of the drugs that are involved here."94
Later that year, Judge Shadur appeared on the
MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour and spoke further about Mr. Marti-
nez's case. He said:
At the time of sentencing, this man gave an extraordinar-
ily eloquent statement.... that [] led to the inevitable
comment, gee, if he had only committed himself to some-
thing constructive, what could he have made of his life? It
seems to me that it is - that it's very difficult to say that,
that someone in that position is sufficiently hopeless in
terms of redemption. 95
Mr. Martinez is the father of two sons and he is very con-
cerned about their future without him.96 He told the judge, "I
brought them into this world - me and Madeleine - and I am defi-
nitely responsible for them no matter where I go."97 In prison, Mr.
Martinez reports that he has not given up on himself or the possi-
92. Id.
93. Id. at 82.
94. Id. Judge Shadur also noted that:
We are fighting what the administration likes to call a "War on
Drugs." It's a war in that sense that I am afraid was lost before it
began. But one reason that it was lost is that there is such profit in
the trade, and because it becomes too easy to make the kind of choice
that you made .... And I can understand why Congress has made
the choices that it has, although in a lot of respects I do not agree
with the method that has been chosen.
Id.
95. MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour (WNET New York television broadcast,
Sept. 1, 1992) (transcript on file with the author). Judge Shadur also criti-
cized cooperation agreements in this broadcast. He noted that the least cul-
pable defendants are the ones least likely to be able to identify people higher
up in the organization and the ones least likely to enter into cooperation
agreements with the government. Thus, they are more likely to have to serve
the full sentence. Id.
96. Martinez Presentence Report, supra note 64, at 15. Mr. Martinez told
the probation officer, that if "he had healthy role models, perhaps he would
not be in the position that finds himself in []." Id.
97. Martinez Sentencing Transcript, supra note 63, at 51.
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bility of freedom. He completed his GED and participates in a
drug treatment program, parenting classes, and other educational
opportunities. 98
The Lawrence Williams case provides another example of this
category. 99 In that proceeding, Judge Matsch, who was appointed
by President Nixon and served as both a state and federal prose-
cutor, 100 was required to sentence this defendant to a thirty-year
term. 10' Lawrence's father was wounded in Vietnam102 and his
mother left the family when he was young.' 03 His paternal grand-
mother raised him in what a family member called a gang-infested
neighborhood. 04 While still in high school, Mr. Williams and his
brothers began an anti-street gang society that became a group
called TRIPS ("Total Reliance In Personal Success"). 0 5 According
to news reports, the group ran several legitimate businesses 06 and
98. Letter from Rudy Martinez, to Families Against Mandatory Mini-
mums (Oct. 30, 1996) (on file with author).
99. This is the case from which I took Judge's Matsch quote. See supra
note 2.
100. 1 ALMANAC OF FED. JUD. 11 (10th Cir. 2004). Judge Matsch was a
bankruptcy judge for almost ten years before his elevation to the district
court. Id. Lawyers similarly gave Matsch top marks for his legal knowledge
and administration of the courtroom. Id. at 12-13. An example of a comment
made by a lawyer who had practiced before Judge Matsch is, "[hie is a top-
rate judge in all categories: intelligence, demeanor, fairness. He's out-
standing." Id. at 12. Criminal defense lawyers consider him fair and tough on
both sides. Id. at 13. On sentencing, defense lawyers believe that Judge
Matsch stays within the guidelines. Id. One said, "It really depends on the
case. I guess I'd describe his sentencing as just." Id. However, another noted,
"I'd say he tends to sentence at the middle-to-upper end of the guidelines." Id.
101. Williams Sentencing Transcript, supra note 2, at 42.
102. Presentence Investigation Report at 6, United States v. Williams (D.
Colo. Jan. 3, 1996) (No 94-CR-254-03-M) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Williams Presentence Report]. Williams's father died in 2001 of cancer, which
may have been the result of exposure to Agent Orange during the Vietnam
War. Letter from Lawrence P. Williams, to David Zlotnick, Associate Profes-
sor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law (Dec. 4, 2003) (on file
with author).
103. Williams Presentence Report, supra note 102, at 6.
104. Id.
105. Id. Mr. Williams claimed that the TRIPS organization was misunder-
stood by the authorities and was actually a legitimate endeavor. Judge
Matsch concluded the jury verdict was correct but he did note at sentencing
that the TRIPS group did do some good and positive things in the community.
Williams Sentencing Transcript, supra note 2, at 27, 40.
106. See John C. Ensslin, Gang Task Force Busts Big Drug Ring, ROCKY
MOUNT. NEWS, Aug. 27, 1994, at IA. They sold pagers, ran an auto-body shop,
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participated in volunteer anti-gang activities in Denver. The police
asserted, however, that the group was also affiliated with drug
gangs from the Chicago South Side, a charge Mr. Williams de-
nied. 107 Nevertheless, a long-term investigation resulted in a
multi-count indictment in which most of the participants pled
guilty in exchange for cooperation agreements. 08
Mr. Williams went to trial and contested much of the evidence
presented through cooperating witnesses. 10 9 The government's
theory was that Mr. Williams was a mid-level supplier for the
TRIP's crack cocaine business in Denver in the early 1990s. 110 The
jury acquitted on some charges, but convicted him of conspiracy to
possess crack cocaine with the intent to distribute."' At sentenc-
ing, Lawrence continued to assert that more culpable co-
defendants lied about his involvement to help themselves." 2 He
told the judge that it was wrong that his refusal to "lie on some
people I know nothing about" resulted in a sentence ten times
more severe than others in the case. 13 He concluded by telling the
judge he was "seeking justice and fairness" and that his "life now
is in your hands."" 4
Judge Matsch first expressed no doubt about the verdict and
found that Mr. Williams should be held responsible for one and a
half kilos of crack." 5 Thus, although Mr. Williams had no previous
record, his guideline range was 360 months to life." 6 Judge
Matsch went on to say,
And my discretion here is limited to whether there should
provided security services, ran a recording studio, did residential construction
and remodeling, and ran party and club activities. Williams Presentence Re-
port, supra note 102, at 8.
107. Williams Presentence Report, supra note 102, at 6.
108. See id. at 1; see also Williams Sentencing Transcript, supra note 2, at
39 (Williams claiming that he was convicted because of "perjury testimonies"
that were exchanged for smaller sentences).
109. See Williams Sentencing Transcript, supra note 2, at 32-38 (discuss-
ing the conflicting testimony/evidence presented at trial).
110. See Government's Sentencing Statement at 12-13, United States v.
Williams (No. 94-CR-254-M) (on file with author).
111. See Williams Presentence Report, supra note 102, at 2-3.
112. Williams Sentencing Transcript, supra note 2, at 39-40.
113. Id. at 40.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 37.
116. Id. at 41. His Guideline offense level was increased two points for his
leadership role and two more for his possession of a gun. Id. at 37-38.
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be any punishment greater than 360 months, and I'm not
going to impose any punishment greater than that. That
is a very great punishment all in and of itself. And the
purpose of all of that, as I've already indicated, is to try to
warn other people away from it, principally, and I've sen-
tenced a lot of people and more keep coming. So I don't
know. But that's what I must do here.117
Mr. Williams' prison reports are good. He has been working,
taking classes, and immersing himself in the prison sports pro-
gram. 118 He is also involved with an at-risk youth counseling pro-
gram called "Jericho Road."119 This program was founded at FCI
Englewood in Colorado by inmate Peter Ninemire, who was par-
doned by President Clinton in 1995.120 Unlike predecessor pro-
grams like "Scared Straight," Jericho Road counselors seek to
build rapport and trust with at-risk youth. 121 Quoted in a newspa-
per article concerning the program, Lawrence states, "It's about
showing a child someone cares and seeing life through their
eyes.... We try to match their realities and show them that we've
been down that path that they are going, and it's a dead end."122
Williams has several children, and in his writing from prison, he
discusses his hope of returning to them before the expiration of his
thirty-year sentence. 123 He also wrote to Judge Matsch about this
subject in 1999, stating,
I'm having [a] very difficult time dealing with the preas-
117. Id. at 41.
118. See Brian Forbes, Recreation as Religion, COLUMBINE COURIER, June
11, 2003, at 10A. He explains that sports help to relieve stress and ease his
mind to make the time go faster. When he was younger, he played semipro
football in Portland and spent a year with the BC Lions in the Canadian
Football League. Id.
119. See Keith Miller, Rerouting a Dead-End Path, COLUMBINE COURIER,




123. Letter from Lawrence P. Williams, to the World (on file with author);
see also Lawrence "Pierre" Williams, Prisoner of the Drug War available at
http://november.org/thewallIcases/williams-1/williams-l.html. Williams ini-
tially reported to U.S. Pretrial Services Officers Joni A. Bedell that he had
fathered approximately nine children. Williams Presentence Report, supra
note 102, at 7. However, Williams subsequently reported that he has fathered
only four children. Id.
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ure [sic] of watching them grow up out there in that world
without there [sic] father. I know I have made some very
selfish decisions in my life to even be in a situation such
as this one. Then although I am responsible, I was not
aware of the consequence. Not only am I sentenced to 30
year[s]. My family is doing the time with me. My children
are doing the time with me. 124
He concluded with a request for a sentencing adjustment
based on his post-sentencing rehabilitation. 125 Judge Matsch re-
plied in a brief note expressing his legal inability to change Mr.
Williams sentence because the Court of Appeals had affirmed his
sentence. 126 Williams has a commutation petition pending but he
is not projected to be released until 2020.127
III. DISPARITY, DISPARITY, DISPARITY
Shifting to another focus of my research, this Part examines
three important aspects of the relationship between judicial dis-
cretion and sentencing disparity. First, while conservatives have
argued that liberal judges are undermining Congressional and
Sentencing Commission efforts to eliminate sentencing disparity,
my interviews reveal a more nuanced and non-partisan explana-
tion for why some judges depart more than others. Second, this
Part explores how the federalization of crime has increased re-
gional sentencing disparity. Thus, while chastising the judiciary,
the Congressional role in aggravating sentencing disparity has
been largely overlooked. Third, in many of my interviews judges
argued that sentencing discretion cannot be eliminated from the
criminal justice system no matter what Congress does. Thus, the
past two decades of sentencing "reform" has largely transferred
this power from the judiciary to the prosecution and police. Here,
a case profile demonstrates how prosecutorial and police choices
124. Letter from Lawrence P. Williams, to The Honorable Chief Judge
Richard P. Matsch, Federal District Court Colo. (March 2, 1999) (on file with
author).
125. Id.
126. Letter from The Honorable Chief Judge Richard P. Matsch, Federal
District Court Colo., to Lawrence P. Williams (Nov. 23, 1999) (on file with au-
thor).
127. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, PROGRESS
REPORT LAWRENCE WILLIAMS, Reg. No. 25599-013 (Aug. 31, 2001).
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result in extreme disparities that outrage the sentencing judge.
This Part, however, should not be read as a condemnation of the
Sentencing Guidelines by the author or the judges interviewed.
Rather, discretion and its byproduct, disparity, should be man-
aged with the help of the judiciary, not driven underground or
transferred to a partisan. In addition, Congress must acknowledge
its own contribution, not seek to place all the blame on the judici-
ary.
A. Judicially Created Disparity: Are Frequent Departers "Liberal"
Law Breakers?
The ideal that similarly situated offenders should receive ap-
proximately the same sentence is unassailable. As recounted in
the original debate over the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, sen-
tences for similar offenses should not vary widely from judge to
judge in the same courthouse. Nor should a bank robber in North
Dakota receive a twenty-year sentence while one in New York is
put on probation. A tension exists, however, between the notion of
equal treatment and the concept of individualized sentencing,
which recognizes that each offense and offender is in some way
unique. Even with guidelines that incorporate differences in
criminal history and role in the offense, judicial sentencing discre-
tion remains necessary because neither Congress nor a sentencing
commission can ever anticipate all the variables that might be
relevant to a particular case and defendant.
Nevertheless, to conservative critics in Congress and the Jus-
tice Department, judicially created sentencing disparity continues
to be the primary problem in the federal criminal justice system.
They believe that pockets of liberal judges are not just "tailoring"
sentences to fit the offender, but rather are using their departure
power to impose lenient sentences, thereby wrecking legislative
and Commission efforts to eliminate sentencing disparity and se-
verely punish criminals. 128 To support their claims, they have
pointed to the ever-increasing percentage of sentences that fall
128. In support of the recent amendment that bears his name, Rep. Tom
Feeney (R -Fl.) claimed that federal judges were giving sex offenders no more
than a "slap on the wrist" and with "increasing frequency." Mark H. Al-
lenbaugh, Who's Afraid of the Federal Judiciary: Why Congress' Fear of Judi-
cial Sentencing Discretion May Undermine a Generation of Reform, THE
CHAMPION, June 2003, at 6, 8, available at Westlaw, 27-JUN CHAMP 6.
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outside the presumptive Guideline range and an overall decrease
in drug sentences over the past ten years. 129 Relying on these
facts, Congress passed the divisive Feeney Amendment last year,
which cut back even further on judicial sentencing discretion and
outraged many members of the judiciary across the political spec-
trum.130
While, as discussed in the next section, many of the conserva-
tive claims about judicial departures are patently false, one won-
ders whether there actually are "pockets" of liberal judges out
there who routinely violate the Guidelines by granting downward
departures because they disagree with the otherwise required stiff
penalties. Because most of the judges in my study expressed dis-
agreement with at least one sentence, it seemed logical to assume
that my methodology would uncover these judges.13' Interestingly,
the hundreds of cases and transcripts I reviewed reveal quite the
opposite. In fact, like Judge Matsch and his predecessors in the
ante-bellum North, the vast majority of federal judges enforce the
law and the Guidelines as written, even when they are expressly
unhappy with the result. To the extent that a strict application of
a particular Guideline or statute is avoided, the parties, including
the prosecutor, usually agree that justice will be better served. 132
My research, however, did identify a small group of judges
who depart downward more than their colleagues. Moreover, the
backgrounds of these judges do appear to be more "liberal" or de-
fense oriented than the majority of the federal bench. Neverthe-
less, they constitute such a small percentage of the federal bench
that their departures cannot be driving the numbers. But more
importantly, in my interviews with some of these judges, their ex-
planations for such departures are more complex and defensible
than the conservative rhetoric suggests. First and foremost, the
judges contend that every one of their departures is completely de-
129. Bowman and Heise, supra note 37, at 1065.
130. David M. Zlotnick, The War Within the War on Crime: The Congres-
sional Assault on Judicial Sentencing Discretion, 57 SMU L. REV. 211, 229-
236 (2004).
131. I found cases by reviewing inmate records at a public interest group
that asked the inmates whether their judge had criticized sentencing policy
or commented on the harshness of their sentence. To ensure a less biased
sample, I also attempted to interview a random sample of judges in select ju-
risdictions.
132. See supra note 40.
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fensible under the Guidelines. This claim appears valid because
very few were appealed by the government, and fewer were re-
versed by the Courts of Appeals.
The judges explain that in most instances, the facts support-
ing the departure existed, but that someone - the judge, probation
officer or defense attorney - simply had to dig deeper to find them.
These judges believe that more judges do not depart more often
because information is not brought to their attention and that
they do not have the background or inclination to go looking for it.
For example, rather than accept the government proffer on drug
quantity, one judge stated that she sometimes decides sua sponte
to hold a quantity hearing. 133 Or, the information necessary to jus-
tify an aberrant behavior or extraordinary family circumstances
departure might require the probation officer to make a trip
across the border to Mexico or have a witness brought into the
country to testify. Thus, while the motivation for a more probing
inquiry might be the judge's view that the proposed sentence is too
high, judge-to-judge disparity in a Guideline regime can depend
more upon the degree of effort exerted by the players and less
upon illegal manipulation by a biased judge. 134
B. Non-Judicially Created Disparity
In 2003, the United States Sentencing Commission issued a
report clearly refuting the notion that judges, liberal or otherwise,
are the chief generators of sentencing disparity. 35 Ironically, ac-
cording to this report, Congress and law enforcement currently ac-
133. Interview with anonymous federal judge (Nov. 17, 2003) (notes on file
with author).
134. Of course, a small number of judges still sentence how they see fit,
regardless of the law's clear mandates. See Dan Herbeck, Elfvin Faces Scru-
tiny Over Lenient Drug Sentences, BUFFALO NEWS, Sept. 5, 2003, available at
2003 WL 6458534. However, in those cases, appellate review should and does
seem to be working to address these concerns. The extent of this sub-minority
is very much in debate, even within the judiciary. At a sentencing conference
I attended at Yale in 2002, a respected federal judge made a short impromptu
speech decrying those judges who manipulate the Guidelines to lower sen-
tences, arguing that such action was unprincipled and unlawful.
135. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, REPORT TO CONGRESS:
DOWNWARD DEPARTURES FROM THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES (Oct.
2003), http://www.ussc.gov/departrpt03/departrptO3.pdf [hereinafter 2003
SENTENCING COMMISSION REPORT].
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count for almost 70% of all downward departures. 13 6 Specifically,
the two largest types of downward departures in federal drug
cases are the congressionally approved and government initiated
fast-track programs and substantial assistance agreements.
A similar study by the United States General Accounting Of-
fice (GAO) provides further support for these contentions. 137 That
study found that 56% of federal drug sentences were within the
applicable guideline range. Of the remaining 44%, over half (28%
of all drug sentences) were departures due to substantial assis-
tance motions. 138 The GAO's findings on mandatory minimums
were similar; slighty more than half of drug sentences fell below
the mandatory minimum with about half of those departures due
to substantial assistance motions.139 The safety valve accounted
for most of the remaining departures (as that is the only other le-
gal means for going below a mandatory minimum).140 The GAO's
findings on fast-track departures are less conclusive due to record
keeping gaps and inconsistencies, especially in the districts that
made the most extensive use of the fast-track mechanism in the
subject period. 14
136. "When substantial assistance departures are combined with the other
government initiated downward departures identified.., the government ac-
counts for over two-thirds (69.3%) of all departures below the guidelines."
2003 SENTENCING COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 135, at 67-68. "The Com-
mission believes that fast-track programs account for a substantial propor-
tion of government initiated downward departures." Id. at v; see also Mark
Allenbaugh, Fighting the Feeney Fear Factor: The Federal Courts Strike Back,
THE CHAMPION, Jan/Feb. 2004, at 46 (countering the assumption that federal
judges are responsible for the downward trend in sentencing).
137. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERAL DRUG
OFFENSES: DEPARTURES FROM SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND MANDATORY
MINIMUM SENTENCES, FISCAL YEARS 1999-2001 (Oct. 2003), http://www.house
.gov/judiciary/d04105.pdf [hereinafter 2003 GAO SENTENCING REPORT].
138. Id. at 12.
139. Id. at 14-15.
140. Id.
141. In fact, the GAO report notes that it only counted cases as fast-track
departures where the judge explicitly listed that reason; thus not counting
hundreds of cases that listed "plea bargain" as the reason for the departure,
when in fact, the plea bargain was based a fast-track disposition. Id. at 26,
67-68. The Judicial Conference Committee on Criminal Law, in a letter writ-
ten by Hon. Sim Lake, Chair, criticized the report for having only two catego-
ries of departures from the Guidelines, substantial assistance and "other
departures." Id. at 77-78 (the GAO included the letter from Judicial Confer-
ence in the Appendix to the study). This latter category combines both fast-
track departures, which are government initiated, with true judicial depar-
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Without question, judicial departures have never exceeded
18.1% of all criminal sentences in a given year prior to 2001.142
This number sounds even more reasonable given that the first
Sentencing Commission estimated that judicial departures would
run about 20%. 143 While isolating judicial departures in just drug
cases is problematic due to data collection difficulties, one inter-
pretation of the recent data is that judicial downward departures
made over government objection in drug cases have run only
about 10%,44 even less than the average for all cases. Of course,
as discussed later in this section, government-initiated downward
departures are just the tip of the iceberg of government's influence
on the ultimate sentence. Investigation and charging decisions
play an even a greater role, but those decisions are made behind
closed doors and cannot be easily studied.
1. Fast-Track Departures and Federalization of Crime
Started on an ad hoc basis by the Justice Department, 145 and
now formalized by statute, 146 the fast-track program allows the
Justice Department to offer reduced sentences to defendants ac-
cused of certain crimes in exchange for quick guilty pleas and
waiver of other rights, such as contesting deportation. 147 Currently
employed in the border districts of the Southwest that have been
overwhelmed by drug and immigration crimes, the fast-track sys-
tem explicitly condones a separate guideline regime for these ju-
tures. This "overly general categorization of 'other downward departures' is
not a meaningful way to analyze sentencing actions," the Committee wrote.
Id. at 77. "Moreover, this approach to reporting the data has resulted in con-
fusion, misinformation, and misuse by some who mistakenly infer that all
'other departures' are attributable to judges." Id. at 78. Thus, this database
does not clearly indicate how many departures from the Guidelines are at-
tributable solely to judges.
142. 2003 SENTENCING COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 135, at 31-32
(excluding statistics of substantial assistance downward departures the
report states "18.1% was the average rate of downward departures in all 94
federal judicial districts"). This average was substantially less throughout the
1990s. Id. at 32.
143. See S. REP. No. 98-223, at 49 n.71 (1983).
144. 2003 GAO SENTENCING REPORT, supra note 137, at 78.
145. Vanessa Blum, Ashcroft Memo Endorses Plan for Swift Pleas: New
Policy Codifies "Fast Track" Cases Processing in Border States, LEGAL TIMES,
Sept. 9, 2003, at 1, available at WL 9/29/2003 LEGALTIMES 1.
146. Pub. L. No. 108-21, 401(m)(2)(B), 117 Stat. 650, 675 (2003).
147. Id.
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risdictions. 148 Now, immigration and drug defendants in New Mex-
ico are, by law, treated differently than offenders convicted of the
crimes in other jurisdictions. While defenders claim the fast-track
system is a temporary measure to deal with emergency situations,
it represents a formal abandonment of the principle of equal
treatment for all defendants in the federal system mandated by
the Sentencing Reform Act. More importantly, for purposes of the
debate over judicial discretion, fast-track departures are not at-
tributable to judges. Yet, the inclusion of the border state fast-
track departures in national downward departure statistics has
been improperly used to justify the recent attacks on judicial dis-
cretion.
But to federal judges, the fast-track program is just the tip of
a more pernicious problem that contributes to sentencing dispar-
ity - the federalization of local crime. Since 1986, federal prosecu-
tors have been bringing drug cases in the federal courts that in
the past would have been handled in state courts. 149 Local drug
crimes could be brought in federal court under federal law prior to
the mid-1980s, but the low threshold mandatory minimums in the
1986 Act enticed police and prosecutors to dramatically increase
the filing of those cases in federal court. 150 Because many federal
drug cases are actually generated by the narcotics units of local
police departments, the customs and priorities of these depart-
ments influence which cases (and how often) they will seek fed-
eral, rather than state, prosecution. 15'
148. According to Professor Frank Bowman "the Justice Department has
'let the camel's nose under the tent."' Blum, supra note 145, at 1.
149. Sara Sun Beale, Get Drug Cases Out of the Federal Courts, WALL ST.
J., Feb. 8, 1990, at A16, available at 1990 W-L-WSJ 589385 (reporting on the
rise in drug cases in the late 1980s in federal court).
150. "In the immediate aftermath of the guidelines and mandatory mini-
mums, drug cases in federal district court constituted approximately forty
percent of the federal docket and account ed] for 44% of criminal trials and
roughly 50% of criminal appeals." Id.
151. The penalties in each state system also have an impact. While federal
penalties are often higher, some states have their own draconian mandato-
ries which lead local police to state rather than federal court. See, e.g., Gary
Heinlein, Michigan Eases Drug Sentences, DETROIT NEWS, Dec. 29, 2002, at 1,
available at 2002 WL 102339705 (reporting Michigan's repeal of its own
mandatory minimum regime, known as the 650 lifer law, which was more se-
vere than their federal counterpart).
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Because no uniform rules govern federal prosecutor's discre-
tion over which cases to accept for prosecution in district court,
different choices made by federal prosecutors in separate jurisdic-
tions result in tremendous variation. Thus, the decision about
where to prosecute a case in the first place is perhaps the most
pernicious and immeasurable cause of disparate treatment of like
offenders in the current system. Some of these decisions are based
on workload. During the cocaine epidemic in the late 1980s, the
U.S. Attorney's Office in the Southern District of Florida rarely
took a federal cocaine case not involving multiple kilos.152 In the
same period in the District of Columbia, ideology ruled and re-
sources were greater. Thus, that office's policy required that every
case that qualified for a mandatory minimum be brought in fed-
eral court. 153
Federalization issues lead to more disparity even after in-
dictment. Many federal prosecutors and judges had their start in
the local system. Many of these players have not completely dis-
carded the local values and customs towards these offenses. Thus,
there tends to be an uneven implementation of the harsh federal
penalties depending on the degree of fealty of the local U.S. Attor-
ney to Washington and varying degrees of autonomy for line
prosecutors in a given office. Moreover, some variation in U.S. At-
torneys' charging and plea practices are not just the result of idio-
syncratic traditions, but often reflect rational choices about local
crime patterns. Thus, a uniform policy for accepting cases or plea
practices arguably would not make good prosecutorial sense ei-
ther.
For example, while possession with intent to distribute a kilo
of cocaine carries a single penalty under federal law, the crime can
be committed under very different circumstances and by different
kinds of offenders across the nation. Prosecutors and judges in
Arizona might very likely look at a poor Mexican defendant paid
$100 to carry a kilo of cocaine across the desert into Arizona quite
152. Frank 0. Bowman III, The Quality of Mercy Must Be Restrained, And
Other Lessons in Learning to Love the Federal Guidelines, 1996 Wis. L. REV.
679, 739 n.219 (1996); see also Karl Ross, Commissioners Go Lukewarm on
Boosting Tribe ' Autonomy, MIAMI HER., Apr. 11, 2003, at 2003 WL 17410398
(discussing the district's continued prosecution of cocaine trafficking only for
large quantities).
153. See Zlotnick, supra note 130, at 222 n.78.
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differently than the defendant who possessed the same quantity of
cocaine with the intent to distribute it in $500 bags to a bunch of
Wall Street investment bankers. Yet, for purposes of the manda-
tory minimum, the quantity is the sole determinant.154
2. Substantial Assistance Disparity
While charging policies and federalization are problematic,
the chief complaint of federal judges is the impact of substantial
assistance agreements. Like charging decisions, cooperation dis-
parities run in every direction, both intra- and inter-case, and
from district to district. With regard to intra-case disparity, coop-
eration agreements allow judges to disregard both the mandatory
minimum and the sentencing guidelines. Thus, in these cases,
judges who disagree with the harshness of the regime can sen-
tence as they see fit. This gulf between sentences for non-
cooperating and cooperating co-defendants can be enormous. The
cooperation system also punishes defendants that were charged
alone or who were marginal participants or romantic partners.
These later defendants often have insufficient information, or le-
gitimate fears of retribution, which results in their having to serve
mandatory minimums while more culpable cooperators get lesser
sentences.
Cooperation agreement disparity is particularly egregious in
cases where the government turns a "big-fish" against his retail
dealers, and then seeks leniency for their cooperator at sentenc-
ing.155 Efforts to litigate cooperator disparity issues, however, are
almost never successful. For example, in Rudy Martinez's case, his
counsel sought a downward adjustment because the cooperating
defendants received substantially reduced sentences from another
judge. 156 Under controlling law, Judge Shadur had to reject this
intra-case disparity argument. 5 7 In doing so he noted, however,
154. 2003 GAO SENTENCING REPORT, supra note 137, at 13.
155. In some cases, prosecutors have recommended a light sentence, even
probation. In most, they tend to stand silent or simply recount the level and
kind of cooperation.
156. Martinez Sentencing Transcript, supra note 63, at 30-32. The judge
ultimately gave Mr. Martinez a two point adjustment for acceptance of re-
sponsibility though that did not affect the statutory life sentence on the CCE
count. Id. at 79.
157. Id. at 33. Judge Shadur now writes, "my recollection is that Pluff was
a materially larger player in the drug market than Martinez - he was not her
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he would not have accepted the pleas from and sentences for these
codefendants because "I view [ that as swallowing the gun."158 He
concluded that this kind of disparity argument has "for better or
worse [been] consistently rejected [] in some quite horrifying deci-
sions."'159
The lack of any rules for sentencing under cooperation agree-
ments also allows for unreviewable disparities between judges, the
bugaboo of the Sentencing Reform Act. Some judges, cognizant of
this unfairness, give less credit for cooperation to reduce intra-
case disparities. 160 In some districts, judges have experimented
with standardized downward departures for cooperation. 16' They
depart downward according to a schedule that specifies a number
of guideline levels or downward percentage of the original Guide-
line sentence. Because there is no cooperation guideline from the
Commission, however, these efforts at self-regulation have led, in
turn, to regional disparities in the treatment of cooperators. 62
Disparity in the sentencing of cooperators from judge to judge
can be measured and studied. For example, cooperator disparity is
readily apparent in the Martinez and Williams cases discussed in
Part 11.163 However, some judges suspect that an additional level
of disparity exists in cooperation cases long before their sentenc-
ing decisions. They believe prosecutors routinely assist coopera-
tors in reducing their sentencing exposure by failing to disclose all
the relevant conduct that might impact the initial guideline of-
fense level. In some cases, this agreement is formalized in a plea
agreement that stipulates to a drug quantity far below the
amounts that could be discovered with additional investigation, or
were already known to investigators. This preferential treatment
only supplier. And that made it all the more troublesome that she was able to
strike a deal that didn't at all reflect the seriousness of her criminal involve-
ment, in contrast with that of Martinez (as serious as his activities were)."
Letter from Milton 1. Shadur, Senior Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the N. Dist.
of Ill., to David Zlotnick, Associate Professor of Law, Roger Williams Univer-
sity School of Law (Nov. 24, 2003) (on file with author).
158. Martinez Sentencing Transcript, supra note 63, at 33.
159. Id.
160. Interview with anonymous federal judge (Nov. 17, 2003) (notes on file
with author).
161. Interview with anonymous federal judge (Nov. 3, 2003) (notes on file
with author).
162. 2003 GAO SENTENCING REPORT, supra note 137, at 4.
163. See supra notes 63-127 and accompanying text.
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leads to disparities that cannot be detected by the regular report-
ing methods, even the new ones mandated by the Feeney Amend-
ment. One judge interviewed for my study told an even more
disturbing tale. He had heard of a case or cases in which coopera-
tors were prosecuted in state court where there were no manda-
tory minimums, while the people they "snitched on" went to
federal court where they faced mandatories and much higher sen-
tences.'6
3. Law Enforcement Created Disparity
Judges and commentators are also starting to focus on how
police and prosecutorial discretion create hidden disparity in non-
cooperation cases. Here, the differences are based not upon efforts
to help a defendant, but by degrees of investigative diligence and
the prosecutorial fervor of particular agents and prosecutors.
First, the police make choices in their investigations that affect
both charging and relevant conduct calculations. In undercover
operations, the number of controlled buys made and the quantities
requested from a target before an arrest will often determine
whether and which mandatory minimum will apply. 165 After a
conspiracy is busted, efforts to "flip" members and obtain detailed
debriefing also vary. Sometimes, the case is presented to the
grand jury and tried simply based on the drugs seized in a single
bust, whereas other agents and prosecutors endeavor to develop a
historical record that leads to an indictment that covers a much
longer period of time (and hence greater quantities).166 In cases
where many defendants cooperate and only a few go to trial, each
164. Interview with anonymous federal judge (Nov. 17, 2003) (notes on file
with author).
165. Some defendants assert that informants or undercover cops ask for
much larger amounts than the defendants normally dealt in order to meet a
mandatory minimum threshold. E.g., United States v. Watkins, 179 F.3d 489,
503 (6th Cir. 1999). Others assert that they were specifically asked for crack
rather than powder so that the 100:1 ratio would apply. E.g., United States v.
Shepherd, 102 F.3d 558, 565-67 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The doctrine of sentencing
entrapment can address a few of the most outrageous cases, but in most cases
there is no relief available.
166. Defendants, too, contribute in a minor way to these disparities by the
decisions they make as well. A drug courier who invokes his Miranda rights
and does not cooperate will likely be sentenced only for the amount of drugs
he is caught with whereas the one who admits to ten previous trips may end
up with substantially more relevant conduct.
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cooperator seeks to attribute a greater role to the remaining de-
fendants. Agents and prosecutors who are conscientious and care-
ful when they debrief cooperating witnesses may be able to elicit
and corroborate accurate information but others seem to accept
drug quantity estimates from cooperators at face value or inadver-
tently give cooperators information or hints about what they want
to hear.
Prosecutorial charging decisions also play a tremendous role
in determining the ultimate sentence. What offenses to charge as
well as decisions about whether to file recidivist enhancement pa-
pers, request role adjustments, or include all possible relevant
conduct lead to tremendous variations in the sentences of simi-
larly situated defendants. Attorney General Ashcroft clearly rec-
ognized this issue in a September 22, 2003 memorandum to all
federal prosecutors in which he instructed them to "charge and
pursue the most serious, readily provable offense or offenses that
are supported by the facts."167 That means, Ashcroft wrote, the of-
fenses that "generate the most substantial sentence or mandatory
minimum." 168 Whether this directive from on high will work is de-
batable, since local U.S. Attorneys' offices and individual assis-
tants have historically had a great deal of autonomy. 169
One example of disparity created solely by the police investi-
gative tactics and charging policy is the Michael Prikakis case
from the Northern District of Florida. Michael Prikakis was born
on a farm in Greece and immigrated to the United States in 1985
after he married a staff sergeant in the U.S. Air Force. 170 He and
167. Memorandum from Attorney General John Ashcroft, to All Federal
Prosecutors, Department Policy Concerning Charging Criminal Offenses, Dis-
position of Charges, and Sentencing, at 2 (Sept. 22, 2003) http://news.findlaw
.com/hdocs/docs/doj/ashcroft92203chrgmem.pdf.
168. Id.
169. "The first fundamental flaw of the federal mandatory minimum pen-
alty scheme is the elimination of judicial discretion and the increase in prose-
cutorial discretion, especially in charging and substantial assistance motions
for a guidelines departure." Celesta A. Albonetti, The Effects of the 'Safety
Valve" Amendment on Length of Imprisonment for Cocaine Traffick-
ing/Manufacturing Offenders: Mitigating the Effects of Mandatory Minimum
Penalties and Offenders Ethnicity, 87 IowA L. REV. 401, 407-08 (2002).
170. Presentence Report at 8, United States v. Prikakis, (N.D. Fl. 1991)
(No. 91-03099-O1/RV) (on file with author) [hereinafter Prikakis Presentence
Report].
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his wife had two children together. 171 He had owned a restaurant
in Greece but helped to support his family in America as a com-
mercial painter. 172 Though both Michael and his wife were work-
ing in 1991, they had more than $5,000.00 in credit card debts and
liens against their cars. 73
Mr. Prikakis had no prior contacts with the law until a confi-
dential informant tipped off the Walton County police that he was
selling powder cocaine in the area. 74 Over a seven day period in
September, 1991, Prikakis sold a total of 86 grams of powder co-
caine to a team of undercover officers - approximately $5,000.00
worth of drugs - during three controlled buys. 75 Under the Guide-
lines, the sentence for this amount of cocaine would have been fif-
teen to twenty-one months. 176 The undercover agents, however,
reported that Prikakis had a pistol with him during each sale. 77
Because of the presence of the gun, the prosecutor elected to
charge him with three separate counts of selling cocaine and three
separate counts of possession of a firearm during a drug traffick-
ing offense. 17s Prikakis admitted selling the cocaine and pled
guilty to the drug charges, but contested the gun counts at trial
and was convicted. 179
Under the prevailing law in the Eleventh Circuit, each gun
charge carried a consecutive and escalating mandatory minimum
- five years for the first count and twenty years for each subse-
quent count - thereby adding forty-five years to the initial fifteen
171. Id.
172. Id. at 9.
173. See Families Against Mandatory Minimums, Profiles of Injustice:
Federal Case Profiles, #02712-017 Michael Prikakis, http://www.famm.org/
Fed%20men/prikakis-profile.htm.
174. Prikakis Presentence Report, supra note 170, at 3.
175. See id. at 4.
176. See id. at 5-7.
177. See id. at 4.
178. See id. at 5-7.
179. Id. at 3. During the first sale, the officers reported that Mr. Prikakis
threatened them with the gun and warned them not to cause him any trou-
ble. During the second sale, also according to the undercover officers, the gun
was on the armrest of his car. During the third sale, when he was arrested,
the government simply reported confiscating the gun. Id. at 4. Mr. Prikakis
admits the gun was in the car when he was arrested but denies ever threat-
ening the officers or displaying the weapon. Letter from Michael Prikakis, to
Families Against Mandatory Minimums (no date provided) (on file with au-
thor).
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to twenty-one month sentence for the drugs. 180 The fact that the
same legally registered gun was used each time was irrelevant.
The stacked gun counts resulted in a final sentence of forty-six
and one half years. 81
Judge Vinson was the presiding judge. He had been appointed
by President Reagan after a career in private practice. 8 2 When
Judge Vinson appeared before the Senate Judiciary Committee in
1983, he concurred that drugs are "the most serious overall crime
problem facing this country," and therefore he "would favor maxi-
mum sentences in those cases."18 3 Nevertheless, Judge Vinson
thought that the Prikakis case was "[t]he most absurd situation
I've ever seen, and to me it constitutes an abuse of the prosecuto-
rial discretion... to impose a forty-five year mandatory minimum
consecutive sentence for this offense."184
It was, as Judge Vinson put it, essentially one drug bust and
there was "no evidence to connect him with any kind of a [distri-
bution] ring."185 Judge Vinson also expressed his concern that be-
cause the case involved controlled buys, the government had
complete and unfettered discretion to increase the defendant's
mandatory time by prolonging the investigation and making more
buys. "[It leaves it entirely in the discretion of the law enforce-
ment and the prosecutorial arm to determine the sentence of the
defendant, knowing that you've got this [924(c)] statute."18 6 He
said the prosecutor was "essentially bypassing the judge's discre-
tion" by charging the defendant in this way.187 Judge Vinson also
thought that the jury that convicted Mr. Prikakis would be
shocked to learn of the sentence; "I think they would rise up in in-
180. Prikakis Presentence Report, supra note 170, at 7.
181. Id.
182. 1 ALMANAC OF THE FEDERAL JUDIcIARY 27 (11th Cir. 2004).
183. Id. at 26-27. Lawyers give Judge Vinson favorable marks for legal
ability and demeanor. One typical comment in lawyers surveyed was, "He is a
fine person and a good judge." Criminal defense lawyers say Vinson is fair
but one noted that he is "prosecution oriented because the system is prosecu-
tion oriented." Criminal defense lawyers say he sentences .within the moder-
ate to heavy range but he can be persuaded to depart. Id.
184. Sentencing Transcript at 15, United States v. Prikakis, (N.D. Fl.
1991) (No. 91-03099-O1IRV) (on file with author) [hereinafter Prikakis Sen-
tencing Transcript].
185. Id. at 14-15, 56.
186. Id. at 49.
187. Id. at 46.
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dignation, as anybody else would, if they know about how this law
is being applied and construed in circumstances such as this,
which is essentially one underlying offense."ss
Judge Vinson compared this case to reports of the penalties
imposed in other countries and said the case was more reminis-
cent of the kinds of outlandish drug penalties in countries like
Turkey or Iran.189 He added
And I don't think this court can be silent as I impose a
sentence that clearly to me is totally unwarranted, is cer-
tainly cruel and unusual, constitutes to me a violation of
due process by the way it was brought about, and in every
respect cannot be viewed as being something that the
people of this country are going to have faith in. If this is
the kind of punishments that have to be meted out with-
out any discretion of the courts, if I'm here simply as a
machine to impose a sentence in accordance with some
statutory mandate, then our system has gone far
awry.... I find this violates my conscience, to tell you the
truth. 190
188. Id. at 17.
189. The judge's exact words were:
In the near past we have all been amazed and astounded at some of
the penalties imposed in other countries, Turkey, for example, or
Greece or Iran about penalties imposed for drug convictions that we
consider to be cruel and unusual and outlandish; and this probably is
more outlandish than anything I've ever heard of.
Id. at 15.
190. Id. at 16. Judge Vinson went on to criticize mandatory minimums,
stating:
I don't think any judge will agree that mandatory sentences are a
good idea; and, in fact, anybody who studies criminology, I think, has
to reach the conclusion that these mandatory sentences run counter
to the intent and purpose of the guideline sentencing procedure it-
self. Clearly, you can't have guidelines if they're all trumped by
mandatory sentences. Clearly, you end up with disproportionate sen-
tences for different people. In other words, it completely obliterates
the sentencing goal of taking into account the individual, which is
supposed to be the function of the guideline sentencing to try to end
up with similar sentences for similarly situated offenders under
similar offenses.
Id. at 54-55.
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CONCLUSION
The conservatives in Congress and the current Justice De-
partment believe that the Sentencing Guidelines and mandatory
minimums are effective crime fighting tools. To the extent some
low-level offenders and "girlfriend" defendants received somewhat
excessive sentences, the conservative storyline is that the problem
has been addressed by the safety-valve and a few other guideline
fixes over the past ten years. Therefore, any current complaints
must be emanating from holdover liberal judges and their allies in
the press.
My research refutes this rosy, limited picture of judicial atti-
tudes towards current sentencing policy. The fact that a majority
of judges are now reasonably comfortable with a sentencing guide-
line regime does not mean that the judiciary is always happy with
the resulting sentences, or more importantly, with the trumping
mandatory minimums. Judicial complaints about arbitrary and
harsh penalties continue, though in a more muted fashion. Some
of these cases continue to be the classic "girlfriend" cases. While
the safety-valve has alleviated some of the worst injustices, the
reach of the conspiracy statute and weight-based penalties ensure
that this type of low-level offender continues to be swept up in
drug enforcement operations.
This essay has also shown that judicial dissatisfaction is not
limited to the long jail terms for the girlfriend cases that garner
the most press, but also includes draconian sentences for more se-
rious drug dealers. These complaints come not from so-called lib-
eral judges, for, in fact, those are now few and far between, but
rather, from Republican appointees and former prosecutors, as
they dutifully but unhappily follow the laws written by Congress
and implemented by the Justice Department. These voices, while
often measured and restrained, are a clear sign that sentencing
policy has become so punitive that even a largely conservative ju-
diciary feels something is amiss.
This essay also challenged the key conservative proposition in
the sentencing debate; if enough restraints are placed on judges so
that they can be prevented from exercising their personal prefer-
ences, sentencing disparities can be eliminated. Both recent stud-
ies, as well as my research, prove that disparity persists despite
20041
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ever stricter limits on judicial discretion.' 91 All the available lit-
erature and research leads to the unavoidable conclusion that dis-
cretion squeezed from the judiciary has simply emerged
elsewhere. The new reality is that the combination of investiga-
tory and charging discretion, together with prosecutor initiated
cooperation agreements, is responsible for far more disparate and
unfair sentencing outcomes than the departure practices of the
federal bench.192 Because police and prosecutor disparity is harder
to detect and virtually unreviewable, and because politicians have
no incentive to face this new reality, the harsh spotlight has re-
mained on the judges.
Ultimately, any future efforts to reform sentencing policy
must deal with the inescapable fact that discretion cannot be
eliminated, only managed. The federal criminal justice system is
simply too diverse, the actions of each defendant, police investiga-
tor and prosecutor are too complex and organic to be reduced to a
one size fits all formula. A truly fair and rational sentencing re-
gime, therefore, would seek to fairly apportion power between
prosecutors and judges. Based upon my interviews, I believe
191. See supra notes 135-142 and accompanying text.
192. Another Judge Vinson case captures almost all the issues discussed
in this essay. Stephanie George is now serving a life sentence for crack. Her
misfortune was to be prosecuted in a Pensacola federal court which handed
out the harshest drug sentences in the country. Her own continuing mistake
was to date crack dealers, including her co-defendant in the final case. In
1996, a raid on her home resulted in the arrest of Ms. George and her latest
boyfriend, Mr. Dickey, and the discovery of $14,000 in cash, cocaine, and
equipment for cooking crack cocaine. Dickey told police that the money and
drugs were his but that he paid Stephanie, who was no longer his girlfriend,
to let him use the house for his drug business. Stephanie decided to go to trial
and was convicted. In addition to the cocaine seized in her house, several co-
operating defendants testified about other episodes in which she assisted Mr.
Dickey and previous boyfriends, resulting in relevant conduct of one and a
half kilos of crack. Ms. George also had prior state convictions for selling
crack for these other men. As the result of her prior convictions and the drug
amount, she was subject to a mandatory life sentence. This seemed unduly
harsh to Judge Vinson who told her at sentencing, "Even though you have
been involved in drugs and drug dealing for a number of years... your role
has basically been as a girlfriend and a bag holder and money holder. So cer-
tainly, in my judgment, it doesn't warrant a life sentence." The reason for the
life term in Ms. George's case was the prosecutor's refusal to withdraw the
career offender enhancement. William Greider, Mandatory Minimums: A Na-
tional Disgrace, ROLLING STONE, Apr. 16. 1998 at 42; see also Presentence Re-
port, United States v. George, (N.D. Fl. 1997) (No. 3:96CR78-002) (on file
with author).
SHOUTING INTO THE WIND
judges would support such an approach, not merely because they
would get some of their power back, but also because they have
come to believe this would be fair. While there was a huge outcry
against the Guidelines when they were released, today, a majority
of judges surveyed by the Commission, and of those I interviewed,
would support a guideline regime, so long as it was more flexible
than the current one, and was not distorted by a mandatory
minimum regime. 193
Both political19 4 and philosophical considerations stand in the
way of such reform. In particular, one must recognize that at the
heart of the conservative attack on judicial discretion are two im-
portant motivating beliefs. First, conservatives believe that the of-
fense or conviction is the primary, if not the exclusive
determinant, of the appropriate sentence. Thus, offender charac-
teristics and other factors which judges see as critical to individu-
alized sentencing, crime control advocates relegate to a minor
role. 195 Second, conservatives view punishment as the primary
goal of sentencing. Rehabilitation, they argue, is too difficult to
predict and they warn that incorrect assessment will endanger
public safety.
Without question, these viewpoints continue to resonate with
Congress and the voters, and, thus, must have a role in any new
sentencing regime. Most judges, too, especially the post-Guideline
crop, agree with the proposition that it would be unwise to return
to a system of unfettered sentencing discretion. But my research
193. As early as 1996, 66.8% of federal district court judges surveyed indi-
cated a preference for an advisory, rather than mandatory, guideline system.
MOLLY TREADWAY JOHNSON & SCOTT A. GILBERT, THE U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES: RESULTS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICAL CENTER'S 1996 SURVEY 4 (1997)
(available in the Federal Judicial Center 2002 Catalog of Publications at
www.fjc.gov).
194. For a discussion of the political considerations, see Zlotnick, supra
note 130.
195. Many senior judges have argued, and some recent studies agree, that
the extent that judicial discretion led to sentencing disparities in the pre-
Guidelines period was actually misunderstood and overstated. There were
some gross disparities and outlier judges with extreme sentencing practices.
But, the total percentage of these outliers was quite small. In fact, most
judges in a given district were reasonably close in sentencing practices, the
result of formal and informal information sharing and the product of local
culture. To the extent that regional disparities existed and persist, that says
more about the federalization of essentially local crime than about judicial
discretion run amok. Id. at 216, n.26.
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reveals the current judiciary - one that is largely centrist and con-
servative - is nevertheless deeply unhappy with Congress' micro-
management of sentencing policy. Thus, politicians should take
note that, perhaps, the pendulum has swung so far to the right
and the time is ripe for a fresh look. This is in fact happening in
some state criminal justice systems as the financial burden of
overly punitive sentencing policies has become too expensive.
On the federal level, the time has come to listen to the voices
of reason. In a democracy that claims much of its strength from
the power of an independent judiciary, we must heed the moment
when its judges proclaim that democratically made laws are nev-
ertheless morally flawed. While by rule and role, many judges feel
compelled to restrain their voices, even small efforts may matter.
Like the "Whos" of "Whoville" in the Dr. Suess classic, 196 some-
times all it takes is one more voice. Now that the Justices of the
Supreme Court are weighing in more forcefully, these voices of
conscience may be heard above the din of political posturing. Per-
haps, too, these judicial voices will provide political cover to a cou-
rageous politician of either party willing to take on this issue.197
Until that day, however, sentencing under the dual mandatory
minimum and Guidelines regimes continues with prosecutors es-
sentially serving as both partisan and judge. To federal judges,
chosen for their experience and judgment, this makes a travesty of
the justice they have sworn to uphold.
196. DR. SUEss, HORTON HEARS A WHO! (Random House 1982) (1954).
197. Although the author in no way endorsed this candidate, Howard
Dean's campaign for the 2004 democratic nomination for president offered
alternatives to the political mainstream on a number of issues. For example,
Dean, on his website, actually took a reform-oriented position on the issue of
mandatory minimums. See Dean for America, available at www.deanforam-
erica.com.
